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I. SUPPLEMENTAL EXAMINATION: A NEW POST-ISSUANCE PROCEEDING TO
REMEDY THE “PLAGUE” OF INEQUITABLE CONDUCT OVER-PLEADING
A unique aspect of patent litigation is that the prosecuting attorney often faces
charges on par with the alleged infringer. Approximately one-third of all patent
infringement lawsuits allege that the prosecuting attorney acted inequitably while
obtaining a patent,1 putting both the patent at risk of being held unenforceable and
the attorney at risk of losing his or her license to practice before the United States
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO or the Office). This is a scary proposition
for the patent practitioner and patent owner, who could both be at risk of losing
their livelihood.
Congress recently enacted the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA),
introducing a new procedure that allows patent owners to, inter alia, preemptively
reduce the likelihood of inequitable conduct claims during future litigation.2
Statutorily, 35 U.S.C. § 257 provides a new post-issuance proceeding called
supplemental examination, which allows a patent owner to remedy potential flaws
accumulated in the course of prosecution of the patent application upon which the
issued patent is based.3 Common flaws include prior art that was not cited and
other information that was not adequately considered during prosecution.
With this first-pass procedure, the patent owner submits the relevant
information to the examiner for consideration in view of the existing patent
claims. 4 If the examiner determines that no substantial new questions of
patentability (SNQP) exist, the patent is “bulletproof” against inequitable conduct
claims during future litigation.5 On the other hand, if the examiner believes an
SNQP exists, ex parte reexamination is ordered to further analyze the
information. 6 If an SNQP exists, the statutory immunity with respect to the

1

Christian E. Mammen, Controlling the “Plague”: Reforming the Doctrine of Inequitable
Conduct, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1329, 1358 (2009) (highlighting table with column C showing
fraction of district court patent infringement proceedings where inequitable conduct was pled
reached forty percent of filings in 2007 and 2008).
2
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 12(a), 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
3
See 35 U.S.C.A. § 257 (West 2012).
4
See id. § 257(a) (West 2012) (requesting that in a supplemental examination the Office
“consider, reconsider, or correct information believed to be relevant to the patent.”).
5
See id. § 257(c)(1) (West 2012) (stating that a patent shall not be held unenforceable if the
information was considered during supplemental examination).
6
See id. § 257(b) (West 2012) (stating that if supplemental examination raises a SNQP, the
Director shall order ex parte reexamination).
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submitted information is still granted and the patent itself may be strengthened or
weakened during the subsequent ex parte reexamination.7
In early 2012, the USPTO proposed rules for supplemental examination,
opening a public-comment period.8 After consideration, the USPTO responded to
the comments and published final rules outlining the specific requirements and
steps to supplemental examination.9
This article begins with a discussion of inequitable conduct10 and follows with
a summary of the supplemental examination rules and comments.11 Next, two
major components of supplemental examination are discussed in depth. First, the
USPTO’s reference to a recent Federal Circuit ruling12 to define “material fraud”
is analyzed to provide specificity regarding its application in practice.13 Second,
the supplemental examination rules are explored for potential holes where a
practitioner could either cleanse a patent of actual inequitable conduct or create
new grounds for inequitable conduct. 14 Finally, statutory amendments are
proposed that could increase access to supplemental examination and reduce
uncertainty.15
II. INEQUITABLE CONDUCT AND CONGRESSIONAL MOTIVATION FOR CHANGE
Patents, by their very nature, affect the public by providing the owner with a
legal monopoly on the invention. To increase the likelihood of granting patent
protection to only novel, useful, and non-obvious inventions, the USPTO requires

7

See id. § 257(c)(1) (West 2012) (stating that statutory immunity to inequitable conduct is
only awarded “if the information was considered, reconsidered, or corrected during a supplemental
examination of the patent.”) (emphasis added).
8
Changes to Implement the Supplemental Examination Provisions of the Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act and to Revise Reexamination Fees—Proposed Rules, 77 Fed. Reg. 3,666,
3,678–81
(proposed
Jan.
25,
2012),
available
at
http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/77fr3666.pdf (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
9
Changes to Implement Supplemental Examination Provisions of the Leahy-Smith America
Invents Act and to Revise Reexamination Fees—Rules and Regulations, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,828,
48,836–45, 48,851–53 (Aug. 14, 2012) [hereinafter Supplemental Examination Provisions of the
AIA], available at http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/fr_supp_exam.pdf (to be codified at
37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
10
See infra Part II.
11
See infra Part III.
12
Supplemental Examination Provisions of the AIA, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,829 (defining
“material fraud” as narrower than inequitable conduct in Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson &
Co., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).
13
See infra Part IV.
14
See infra Part V.
15
See infra Part VI.
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applicants to disclose “all information material to patentability.”16 The underlying
policy is that the applicant is in the best position to have full knowledge of the art
and disclosure of this information leads to higher quality examination.
In this section, the “duty of candor” is introduced with respect to inequitable
conduct and the doctrine of “unclean hands.” 17 Next, inequitable conduct is
discussed as a litigation strategy, including how the perceived benefits have led to
over-pleading and quantitative research supporting this view.18 Taken together,
these trends provided the congressional motivation to enact supplemental
examination.19
A. Duty of Candor and Inequitable Conduct
An inventor applying for a patent has a duty of candor and good faith in
dealing with the USPTO, including the obligation to disclose all information
material to patentability.20 Common “material” information includes references
cited by a foreign patent office while prosecuting a counterpart application and
statements regarding the patentability of the invention (e.g., arguments made to a
foreign patent office).21
The duty of candor applies to all parties associated with the filing and
prosecution of a patent application, including the attorney or agent representing
the inventor.22 Known as “Rule 56,” a failure to meet this obligation may23 result
in an unenforceable patent if the breach exceeds the threshold of inequitable
conduct.24

16

37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2012) (charging each individual associated with the patent with a duty
of candor and good faith, including the duty to disclose all information material to patentability).
17
See infra Part II.A.
18
See infra Part II.B.
19
See infra Part II.C.
20
See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b) (stating that information is material if it is not cumulative to the
record and either establishes a prima facie case of unpatentability or is inconsistent with an
argument of patentability).
21
See id. § 1.56(a)(1–2) (encouraging applicants to carefully examine prior art cited in search
reports of a foreign patent office in a counterpart application).
22
See id. § 1.56(c)(2) (charging “[e]ach attorney or agent who prepares or prosecutes the
application” with the duty of candor and good faith).
23
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(cautioning that because of the severity of punishment, inequitable conduct should only be applied
if the penalty is commensurate with the violation).
24
Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(“[A]n applicant’s misrepresentation or failure to meet his ‘duty to disclose’ . . . will not in itself
render a patent invalid or unenforceable [but] . . . may be determined [under the appropriate
standard].”).
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Inequitable conduct refers to a legal principle “that is different from, but
related to, the duty of disclosure.”25 The principle is rooted in the doctrine of
“unclean hands,” where a patent owner seeking judicial enforcement of a patent is
barred from remedies if the patent was obtained using disreputable means.26
“Unclean hands” applies to applicants who, with the intent to mislead or deceive
the examiner, withhold material information or submit materially false
information to the USPTO during patent prosecution.27 These two elements—
intent to deceive and materiality of information—comprise the two-prong test for
inequitable conduct.
Successful inequitable conduct claims provide alleged infringers with the
valid affirmative defense of unenforceability.28 This is the “atomic bomb” of
patent litigation because it makes the patent valueless and even provides for
recovery of attorney fees.29 Thus, failing to fulfill the duty of disclosure could
spell devastation for the patent owner and his representatives, providing a
windfall to any competitors. It is no wonder that pleading inequitable conduct is a
key strategy in many patent litigation cases.30
First, unenforceability applies not only to the accused claims, but the entire
patent and potentially related patents in which the same information was
withheld.31 Thus, one inequitable conduct claim could wipe out an entire patent
portfolio. A second advantage to the party asserting the claim is that both the
25

R. Carl Moy, The Effect of New Rule 56 on the Law of Inequitable Conduct, 74 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 257, 260 (1992) (referring to a common basis for inequitable conduct,
“allegations that the patent owner acted unfairly in the prosecution of the patent.”).
26
Mammen, supra note 1, at 1334 (“[A] patentee seeking to enforce its patent rights must not
come before the court with unclean hands due to his intentional misleading of the PTO in order to
obtain the patent.”); see also Robert J. Goldman, Evolution of the Inequitable Conduct Defense in
Patent Litigation, 7 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 37, 49–50 (1993).
27
Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp., 363 F.3d 1321, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
28
35 U.S.C.A. § 282(b)(1) (West 2012) (“The following shall be defenses in any action
involving the validity or infringement of a patent and shall be pleaded: (1) . . . unenforceability.”).
29
Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 525 F.3d 1334, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(Rader, J., dissenting) (“The threat of inequitable conduct, with its ‘atomic bomb’ remedy of
unenforceability, ensures that candor and truthfulness.”); see also Ningling Wang & Thomas L.
Irving,
Whither
Therasense?,
FINNEGAN
(May
16,
2012),
http://www.finnegan.com/FCWSite/abc.aspx?url=http%3a%2f%2fwww.finnegan.com%2fnews%
2fnewspdf.aspx%3fnews%3d08f8e827-0cee-4886-abb4-3e41ca27be99%26pdf%3dtrue
(stating
that alleged infringers will continue to assert inequitable conduct so long as the cost is minimal,
the burden on the patentee is high, and the payoff is the “atomic bomb”).
30
Jay Erstling, Patent Law and the Duty of Candor: Rethinking the Limits of Disclosure, 44
CREIGHTON L. REV. 329, 337 (2011) (quoting Federal Circuit Chief Judge Randall R. Rader
characterizing the growth of inequitable conduct as a litigation strategy as a “ubiquitous weed”).
31
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(“[I]nequitable conduct renders an entire patent (or even a patent family) unenforceable . . . .”).
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inventor and the patent practitioner will likely be subject to deposition covering
any relevant documents.32 This provides a unique window into the prosecution
history and blurs the attorney-client privilege.33 A third advantage is that the
asserting party can paint the inventor as deceitful, in contrast with the typical
narrative of an opportunistic scientist. 34 Thus, the accused infringer has an
incentive to plead inequitable conduct at the slightest opportunity because the
strategic and technical advantages are “too attractive to ignore.”35
B. Inequitable Conduct as a “Plague”
Inequitable conduct over-pleading was first characterized as a “plague” by the
Federal Circuit in 1988.36 Since then, it has not disappeared and has in fact
increased, leading some commentators to call for curtailment of Rule 56, 37
refinement of the duty of disclosure to include keywords for examiner searches,38
and even the abolition of inequitable conduct as an affirmative defense.39
Between 2000 and 2008, inequitable conduct pleadings at the district court
level rose in a near-linear fashion from around four to forty percent. 40
Conspicuously divergent from this trend is a relatively stable fraction of cases that
actually uphold inequitable conduct claims at the Federal Circuit. This “ultimate
success rate” hovers around 0.50% for the same period, though some factors are
32

Mammen, supra note 1, at 1332 (“[M]ost relevant documents will come from the files of
the inventor and the patent attorney who prosecuted the patent, and those individuals will likely be
subject to deposition.”).
33
Id. (citing an “asymmetrical discovery burden”).
34
Id. (stating that the accused infringer can “impugn the character of the inventor and her
counsel, providing a counterbalance to the patentee's likely narrative at trial of the inventor as an
idealized genius.”).
35
John F. Lynch, An Argument for Eliminating the Defense of Patent Unenforceability Based
on Inequitable Conduct, 16 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N Q. J. 7, 8 (1988).
36
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“[T]he habit
of charging inequitable conduct in almost every major patent case has become an absolute plague.
Reputable lawyers seem to feel compelled to make the charge against other reputable lawyers on
the slenderest grounds, to represent their client’s interests adequately, perhaps.”).
37
See, e.g., Erstling, supra note 30, at 365 (“Short of abolishing the duty of candor altogether,
an alternative would be to follow the model of the European Patent Office (“EPO”). Under such a
system, no duty of disclosure would be imposed on an applicant unless an examiner determined
that information was needed but the examiner was unable to access it herself.”).
38
Giuseppe Scellato et al., Study on the quality of the patent system in Europe, PATQUAL,
91–93 (Mar. 2011),
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/docs/patent/patqual02032011_en.pdf.
39
Katherine E. White, “There’s a Hole in the Bucket:” The Effective Elimination of the
Inequitable Conduct Doctrine, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 716, 730 (2012).
40
See Mammen, supra note 1, at 1358–60 (outlining a table and corresponding graphic
illustrating trends in inequitable conduct pleading).
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not considered. 41 These factors include the number of settled cases where
inequitable conduct claims played a role in the decision to settle, cases that were
not appealed, and cases where inequitable conduct was not addressed on appeal.
Nonetheless, the steady increase of inequitable conduct pleadings supports the
categorization of inequitable conduct over-pleading as a “plague.”42
C. Congressional Motivations
Supplemental examination blossomed from Senator Orrin Hatch’s advocacy
to restrict the inequitable conduct doctrine due to its ever-increasing burden on
patent litigation.43
Discovery in any litigation is costly and inequitable conduct claims are no
different. In 2011, the median cost to reach the end of discovery was one-and-a
half-million dollars for a patent infringement case seeking one to twenty-five
million dollars in damages.44 If a patent suit includes an inequitable conduct
claim, this requires both sides to spend a substantial sum to explore these
allegations, which only adds to the cost.
The risk of defending inequitable conduct claims often deters investors,
especially because an inequitable conduct finding could render a portion of the
patent portfolio unenforceable, wiping out the entire investment. 45 Congress
included supplemental examination in the AIA to resolve such uncertainties with
respect to patents.46 This should increase patent-driven innovation with all of the
ensuing economic benefits.47
In essence, Congress sought to provide an expedited procedure for a patent
owner to eliminate uncertainty, at least with respect to potential flaws in patent
prosecution.48 In theory, this would be useful to convince a skeptical investor by

41

Id. (illustrating trends in inequitable conduct success on appeal).
Id. at 1360.
43
Joe Matel, A Guide To The Legislative History Of The America Invents Act: Part II of II, 21
FED. CIR. B. J. 539, 546 (2011) (“Senator Hatch continued to pursue inequitable-conduct reform,
arguing that the defense has been overpleaded and ‘has become a drag on the litigation process.’”
(citing 153 CONG. REC. S4691 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 2007) (statement of Sen. Hatch))).
44
AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2011, at I-153
(2011) (Tbl. Q42c) (reporting industry statistics).
45
157 CONG. REC. S5319 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
46
See id.
47
See id. (“[S]upplemental examination will result in path-breaking inventions being
developed and brought to market that otherwise would have lingered on the shelf because of legal
uncertainty . . . .”).
48
Id. (“Currently, even minor and inadvertent errors in the patent application process can lead
to expensive and very unpredictable and very inequitable conduct litigation.”).
42
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“bulletproofing” a patent in view of an inconsistent position or prior art not
presented to the USPTO.49
III. FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL EXAMINATION RULES AND COMMENTS
The new 35 U.S.C. § 257 provides the statutory basis for supplemental
examination,50 and recently the USPTO issued final supplemental examination
rules outlining the filing process.51 A supplemental examination request must
comply with formal requirements, including joinder of all parties, a fee, up to
twelve items of information, and any optional explanations. 52 During
supplemental examination, the examiner will determine if the submitted
information raises a SNQP or uncovers any material fraud.53 Upon conclusion,
the USPTO will publish a supplemental examination certificate and may order ex
parte reexamination if an SNQP arises.54 Interspersed within the discussion of
these rules that follow in the next few sections are relevant public comments.
A. Statutory Basis
Supplemental examination under 35 U.S.C. § 257 became available to patent
owners on September 16, 2012. 55 Section 257(a) describes the supplemental
examination request and places a three-month statutory deadline for the USPTO
to issue a supplemental examination certificate, which indicates whether the
information raises an SNQP.56 Section 257(b) states that ex parte reexamination is
required if any item of information raises an SNQP.57 Under § 257(c), the patent
cannot be held unenforceable in view of information considered during

49

Id. (“It is often the case that startup companies or university researchers cannot afford to
hire the very best patent lawyers. . . . Later, when more legally sophisticated investors evaluate the
patent for potential investment or purchase, these minor flaws in prosecution can deter the investor
from purchasing or funding the development of the invention.”).
50
See infra Part III.A.
51
See infra Part III.B.
52
See infra Part III.C.
53
See infra Part III.D.
54
See infra Part III.E.
55
35 U.S.C.A § 257 (West 2012).
56
See id. § 257(a) (West 2012) (“A patent owner may request supplemental examination of a
patent in the Office to consider, reconsider, or correct information believed to be relevant to the
patent . . . . Within 3 months after the date a request for supplemental examination meeting the
requirements of this section is received, the Director shall conduct the supplemental examination
and shall conclude such examination by issuing a certificate indicating whether the information
presented in the request raises a substantial new question of patentability.”)
57
See id. § 257(b) (West 2012) (“If the certificate issued under subsection (a) indicates that a
substantial new question of patentability is raised by 1 or more items of information in the request,
the Director shall order reexamination of the patent.”).
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supplemental examination. 58 This protection extends to the request itself. 59
Exceptions exist where supplemental examination does not preempt a civil suit
claim filed prior to the supplemental examination request.60 Similarly, the benefits
of supplemental examination do not extend to patent enforcement actions until all
proceedings are concluded.61 Next, § 257(d) gives the USPTO the authority to
establish fees and regulations.62 Finally, if the Office learns of a material fraud, §
257(e) directs the Director to refer the matter to the Attorney General.63
B. Filing a Supplemental Examination Request
1. Filing of Papers
a. All Parties of Any Interest Must Join the Request
A patent owner may request supplemental examination at any time during the
period of enforceability of a patent.64 The USPTO deems any party with an
ownership interest in a patent a “patent owner.”65 Since the result of supplemental

58

See id. § 257(c)(1) (West 2012) (“A patent shall not be held unenforceable on the basis of
conduct relating to information that had not been considered, was inadequately considered, or was
incorrect in a prior examination of the patent if the information was considered, reconsidered, or
corrected during a supplemental examination of the patent.”).
59
See id. § 257(c)(1) (West 2012) (“The making of a request under subsection (a), or the
absence thereof, shall not be relevant to enforceability of the patent under section 282
[presumption of validity; defenses].”)
60
See id. § 257(c)(2)(A) (West 2012) (“Paragraph (1) shall not apply to an allegation pled
with particularity in a civil action . . . before the date of a supplemental examination request . . .
.”).
61
See id. § 257(c)(2)(B) (West 2012) (“[P]aragraph (1) shall not apply to any defense raised
in [a patent enforcement] action . . . unless the supplemental examination, and any reexamination
ordered pursuant to the request, are concluded before the date on which the action is brought.”).
62
See id. § 257(d) (West 2012).
63
See id. § 257(e) (West 2012) (“If the Director becomes aware . . . that a material fraud on
the Office may have been committed in connection with the patent that is the subject of the
supplemental examination . . . the Director shall . . . refer the matter to the Attorney General for
such further action as the Attorney General may deem appropriate.”).
64
Changes to Implement Supplemental Examination Provisions of the Leahy-Smith America
Invents Act and to Revise Reexamination Fees, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,828, 48,852 (Aug. 14, 2012)
[hereinafter Supplemental Examination Provisions of the AIA], available at
http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/fr_supp_exam.pdf (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. §
1.601(c)).
65
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 301(IV) (8th ed., rev. 8, Aug. 2012) [hereinafter MPEP] (“All parties
having any portion of the ownership of the patent property must act together as a composite entity
in patent matters before the Office.”).
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examination is binding on the entire patent, all owners are required to join.66 Nonpatent owners (e.g., third parties) cannot participate in supplemental examination
proceedings and are barred from filing any papers or other submissions related
thereto.67
b. Fees Due at Filing
i. Rule
Effective March 19, 2013, the request must include $16,500,68 covering both
the cost of the supplemental examination and the potential ex parte reexamination
filing fees: $4,400 and $12,100, respectively, with the latter fee being refunded if
no SNQP is raised. 69 Recent legislation will reduce these fees for small and micro
entities,70 potentially because of the widespread public response.
ii. Commentary
A number of public comments expressed some form of sticker shock. This is
understandable because the cost of pre-AIA ex parte reexamination was just
$2,520.71 The USPTO appears to justify this fee increase to “encourage applicants
to provide all relevant information during initial examination, which facilitates
compact prosecution.”72 Yet this logic is faulty because the motivation behind
supplemental examination was to provide an avenue to avoid spending resources
in litigation debating inequitable conduct claims.73

66

Supplemental Examination Provisions of the AIA, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,832 (to be codified at
37 C.F.R. § 1.601(a)) (“A request for supplemental examination of a patent must be filed by the
owner(s) of the entire right, title, and interest in the patent.”).
67
Id. at 48,852 (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.601(b)).
68
Setting and Adjusting Patent Fees—Final Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 4,212, 4,232 (Jan. 18, 2013),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-01-18/pdf/2013-00819.pdf (to be codified at
37 C.F.R. § 1.20(k)(1–2)) (displaying Table 19 that shows a twenty-two percent fee reduction
from initial projections).
69
Supplemental Examination Provisions of the AIA, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,851 (to be codified at
37 C.F.R. § 1.26(c)).
70
Setting and Adjusting Patent Fees—Final Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. at 4,232 (displaying Table 19
that shows a sixty-one and eighty-one percent fee reduction for small and micro entities,
respectively).
71
37 C.F.R. § 1.20(c)(1) (2010).
72
Executive Summary: Patent Fee Proposal, PATENT PUBLIC ADVISORY COMMITTEE,
USPTO, (Feb. 7, 2012), available at http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/fee_setting__ppac_hearing_executive_summary_7feb12.pdf.
73
157 CONG. REC. S5319 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
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A discrepancy arises when a patent owner seeks to submit fewer than twelve
items yet pays the flat rate for up to twelve items.74 This illustrates the disparity
between the fee calculation and the actual cost of administering supplemental
examination. This is unfortunate because “Congress has provided a new avenue to
remove inequitable conduct issues, but the PTO immediately sets fees to deter the
use of the procedure.”75
c. Filing Date Awarded upon Perfection of Request
Upon perfection of the supplemental examination request, a filing date will be
awarded, though a patent owner will be given time to submit missing parts to an
incomplete request.76 At that time, the three-month statutory clock begins, during
which the USPTO must complete the supplemental examination. 77 The
supplemental examination request will be available in the public Patent
Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system only after the request is
perfected78 in order to avoid a “race to the court.”79
C. Content of Request
1. Request Limited to Twelve Items of Information
a. Rule
A supplemental examination request is limited to twelve items of information,
although more than twelve items can be presented by filing multiple requests.80
An item is broadly defined as anything relevant to patentability, including patents,

74

Supplemental Examination Provisions of the AIA, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,830, 48,842 (to be
codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.605(a)); see also Setting and Adjusting Patent Fees—Final Rule, 78 Fed.
Reg. at 4,248.
75
Letter from Richard F. Phillips, President, Intellectual Prop. Owners Ass’n, to David J.
Kappos, Under Sec’y of Commerce for Intellectual Prop., Dir. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, at
3
(Mar.
23,
2012)
(on
file
with
USPTO),
available
at
http://www.paulhastings.com/assets/pdfs/IPOcomments.pdf (commenting on proposed fees).
76
Supplemental Examination Provisions of the AIA, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,852 (to be codified at
37 C.F.R. § 1.610(d)).
77
35 U.S.C.A. § 257(a) (West 20012) (“Within 3 months after the date a request for
supplemental examination meeting the requirements of this section is received, the Director shall
conduct the supplemental examination and shall conclude such examination by issuing a
certificate . . . .”).
78
Supplemental Examination Provisions of the AIA, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,830 (“The Office,
however, is establishing a procedure in which the request, and any other papers or information
submitted as part of or accompanying the request, will not be available in Public PAIR until the
request meets the conditions to be entitled to a filing date.”).
79
Id. at 48,842 (USPTO response to comment 23).
80
Id. at 48,852 (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.605(a)).
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printed publications, audio or video recordings, and evidence of a prior sale.81 The
Office “reserves its option to merge supplemental examination proceedings as
circumstances arise.”82
b. Commentary
Although the Office received suggestions to use a sliding scale,83 it chose a
flat fee to comply with the statutorily mandated three-month reply period.84 The
Office provided additional justification for the twelve-item limit, reporting that
ninety-three percent of ex parte reexamination requests in 2011 included twelve
items or fewer.85 This is unfortunate for patent owners wishing to submit more
than twelve items because the thirteenth item doubles the cost, but due to
economies of scale, almost certainly does not double the burden. This situation
provides a windfall to the Office.
Submissions with more than twelve items may be commonplace if
supplemental examination is used to “cleanse” a patent portfolio prior to
acquisition, especially if patents in the portfolio were not prosecuted with
sophisticated counsel. 86 This is especially relevant considering that a single
successful inequitable conduct charge can tarnish an entire patent family.87
Another commentator noted that during discovery, “literally dozens of
potential inequitable conduct allegations are pursued, particularly during
discovery, in hopes of finding a subset of such issues to pursue and present at
81

See id. at 48,852 (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.605(b)); see also id. at 48,833 (discussion
of Rule 1.605(b)).
82
See id. at 48,839 (USPTO response to comment 9 regarding merger).
83
Letter from Robert A. Armitage, Section Chairperson, Am. Bar Ass’n Section of
Intellectual Prop. Law, to David J. Kappos, Under Sec’y of Commerce for Intellectual Prop., Dir.
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, at 2 (Mar. 23, 2012) (on file with USPTO), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/comments/sup_exam/xs_a-aba_20120323.pdf (“1. The Hard
[12-item] Limit for Items of Information Cited in a Request for Supplemental Examination Should
be Replaced by a Sliding Fee Scale for Additional Items of Information.”).
84
David Kappos, The Role of Submission Limits in Timely Completion of Supplemental
Examination, DIRECTOR’S FORUM: A BLOG FROM USPTO’S LEADERSHIP (Apr. 27, 2012),
http://www.uspto.gov/blog/director/entry/the_role_of_submission_limits (describing the conflict
between providing a quick (three-month period) yet decisive examination of overlooked items and
the inevitable complexity that too many items invites).
85
Supplemental Examination Provisions of the AIA, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,830.
86
Letter from William G. Barber, President, Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass’n, to David J.
Kappos, Under Sec’y of Commerce for Intellectual Prop., Dir. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, at
2
n.4
(Mar.
26,
2012)
(on
file
with
USPTO),
available
at
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/comments/sup_exam/xs_a-aipla_20120326.pdf (speculating on
potential uses of supplemental examination and the importance of sophisticated counsel).
87
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1292 (“[I]nequitable conduct
renders an entire patent (or even a patent family) unenforceable . . . .”).
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trial.”88 Thus, although fewer than twelve items may be presented in court, many
more are likely to be alleged pre-trial. This runs counter to the USPTO rationale
that “inequitable conduct . . . during patent litigation . . . typically concern[s] far
fewer than twelve items of information.”89
One irony is that Congress enacted the three-month limit to expedite the
supplemental examination process. Yet there is no time limit on any subsequent
ex parte reexamination proceedings. Thus, for any supplemental examinations
that proceed to ex parte reexamination, the three-month turnaround may be of
minor importance compared to the uncertain duration of reexamination.
2. Other Content Requirements
In addition to including the items of information relevant to patentability,
multiple other content requirements exist.90 Notably, the request must identify the
patent claims for which supplemental examination is requested and include a
“separate, detailed explanation of the relevance and manner of applying each item
of information to each claim of the patent for which supplemental examination is
requested.”91 This is important because it implies that the patent owner may limit
the scope of supplemental examination to specific claims as opposed to the patent
as a whole. Furthermore, the patent owner can frame any relevant issues in
favorable light, or guide the examiner away from sensitive issues, as discussed in
section V below.
3. Request May Include Additional Explanations
Although not required, the patent owner may submit additional explanations
to the examiner.92 This may assist the examiner in focusing on the relevant issues,
though it may also raise potential problems if the patent owner steers the
examiner away from difficult or problematic aspects of the reference. Again, this
is discussed in section V below.
D. Supplemental Examination Proceedings

88

Letter from Robert A Armitage, supra note 83, at 2 n.1 (commenting on placing a limitation
on the number of items).
89
Supplemental Examination Provisions of the AIA, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,830.
90
Id. at 48,852 (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.610(b)) (listing nine separate requirements to
the supplemental examination request).
91
Id. at 48,852 (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.610(b)(4)–(5)).
92
Id. at 48,852 (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.610(c)(3)–(4)) (stating that the owner may
include “[a]n explanation of how the claims patentably distinguish over the items of information”
and “[a]n explanation of why each item of information submitted with the request does or does not
raise a substantial new question of patentability.”).
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After a filing date is awarded, the Office has three months to determine if an
SNQP exists.93 The Office will examine the information provided in view of the
applicable claims, however, the precise scope of the proceedings is ambiguous.94
The Office will also search for any indications of material fraud.
1. Scope of Proceedings
“Within three months after the filing date of a request for supplemental
examination, the Office will determine whether a substantial new question of
patentability affecting any claim of the patent is raised by any of the items of
information presented in the request.”95 It is important to note how the “any-any”
language encompasses any claim and any item. Yet the next sentence in the rule
appears to limit this all inclusive language: “The determination will generally be
limited to a review of the item(s) of information identified in the request as
applied to the identified claim(s) of the patent.”96 This potential mismatch in
scope is discussed in Part V below.
Although a SNQP is never defined in a statute, the MPEP states that “[a] prior
art patent or printed publication raises a substantial question of patentability
where there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable examiner would consider
the prior art patent or printed publication important in deciding whether or not the
claim is patentable.”97 There is no reason to believe this definition would not
apply to information submitted during a supplemental examination.
2. Material Fraud
If the Office uncovers any fraud, the matter will be referred to the U.S.
Attorney General in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 257(e), though the Office
anticipates that such instances will be rare.98 Although not incorporated into §
1.620, the Office defined “material fraud” as narrower in scope than the
inequitable conduct in Therasense.99
3. Other Limitations
93

35 U.S.C.A. § 257(a) (West 2012).
See infra Part V.A.1.
95
Supplemental Examination Provisions of the AIA, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,852 (to be codified at
37 C.F.R. § 1.620(a)) (emphasis added).
96
Id. (emphasis added).
97
MPEP, supra note 65, § 2242(I) (although a SNQP will not be found if the “same question
of patentability has already been decided as to the claim in a final holding of invalidity by the
Federal court system or by the Office in a previous examination.”) A common example is
cumulative prior art already considered. Id.
98
Supplemental Examination Provisions of the AIA, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,853 (to be codified at
37 C.F.R. § 1.620(g)) (providing guidance for how the USPTO should handle fraud).
99
Id. at 48,829; see also infra Part IV (discussing material fraud in view of Therasense).
94
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The rules provide no options for communicating with the Office outside of the
supplemental examination request. For example, substantive interviews with the
examiner are prohibited,100 and amendments cannot be filed.101
E. Conclusion from the Supplemental Examination Analysis
By the end of the three-month statutory period, the Office will issue a
supplemental examination certificate indicating whether a SNQP exists.102
1. If a SNQP Exists
If the Office finds a SNQP in light of one or more items of information, the
examiner will order ex parte reexamination in accordance with § 257(b). 103
Although the ensuing ex parte reexamination is limited to items included in the
supplemental examination request, any claim in the patent may be examined.104
Interestingly, although the ex parte reexamination must address each SNQP
identified during supplemental examination,105 the rules give the examiner the
freedom to raise new SNQPs and consider items of information that did not
previously raise a SNQP.106 The supplemental examination certificate will only
indicate that a SNQP was raised, and an ex parte reexamination certificate will
publish when the matter concludes.107
2. If no SNQP Exists
If the Office finds that no SNQP exists, the electronic supplemental
examination certificate will issue, ex parte reexamination will not be ordered, and
the fee will be refunded.108 The supplemental examination certificate will indicate
that no SNQP was raised by any of the items of information considered.109
100

Id. at 48,853 (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.620(e)).
Id. (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.620(f)).
102
Id. (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.625(a)–(c)).
103
Id. (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.625(b)).
104
Id. (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.625(d)(2)) (“Reexamination of any claim of the patent
may be conducted on the basis of any item of information as set forth in § 1.605.” (emphasis
added)).
105
35 U.S.C.A. § 257(b) (West 2012) (“[T]he Director shall address each substantial new
question of patentability identified during the supplemental examination . . . .”).
106
Supplemental Examination Provisions of the AIA, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,853 (to be codified at
37 C.F.R. § 1.625(d)(2–3)) (“(2) Reexamination of any claim of the patent may be conducted on
the basis of any item of information; . . . (3) Issues in addition to those raised by patents and
printed publications . . . may be considered and resolved . . . .”).
107
See id. at 48,853 (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.625(b)).
108
See id. at 48,853 (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.625(c)) (stating that if there is no SNQP,
then the reexamination fee is refunded in accordance with 37 C.F.R. § 1.26(c)).
109
Id. (stating that the certificate will indicate whether any item considered raised a SNQP).
101
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Regardless of whether a SNQP arises, supplemental examination, by itself, is
enough to grant the patent immunity with respect to the items considered.110 Thus,
unless an exception applies,111 the patent cannot be held unenforceable in view of
the information considered during supplemental examination.
Nonetheless, there is some risk during every supplemental examination that
the Office may determine that the new information presents evidence of material
fraud. While finalizing the AIA, Senator Kyl recommended that the standard for
judging material fraud should be in line with Therasense,112 persuading the Office
to use this standard as the lower boundary for material fraud. Of course, this
standard is subject to judicial interpretation.
IV. MATERIAL FRAUD IN VIEW OF THERASENSE
Although supplemental examination is supposed to shield a patent owner from
inequitable conduct claims, the Office could actually uncover material fraud
during supplemental examination. The Office refers to inequitable conduct in
Therasense to define the lower boundary of material fraud.113 The Therasense
court shifted inequitable conduct jurisprudence towards a stricter standard.114 The
interplay between supplemental examination and Therasense is likely to be
minimal because the standard requires egregious deception, the applicant controls
which documents are reviewed, and third party submissions are excluded.115
A. Defining Material Fraud and Inequitable Conduct
The Office states that “material fraud” is narrower than inequitable conduct as
defined in Therasense.116 Inequitable conduct requires two elements: (1) intent to
deceive and (2) materiality of the reference with respect to patentability.117 Under
110

35 U.S.C.A. § 257(c)(1) (West 2012) (stating that a patent shall not be held unenforceable
if the information was considered during supplemental examination).
111
35 U.S.C.A. § 257(c)(2) (West 2012) (providing exceptions for prior allegations and
present patent enforcement actions).
112
157 CONG. REC. S5429 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl). (suggesting that
the Director should use the standard in Therasense to determine whether a fraud is “material”).
113
See infra Part IV.A.
114
See infra Part IV.B.
115
See infra Part IV.C.
116
Changes to Implement Supplemental Examination Provisions of the Leahy-Smith America
Invents Act and to Revise Reexamination Fees—Rules and Regulations, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,828,
48,829 (Aug. 14, 2012) [hereinafter Supplemental Examination Provisions of the AIA], available
at http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/fr_supp_exam.pdf (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
117
See Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1365 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (“To successfully prove inequitable conduct, the accused infringer must present ‘evidence
that the applicant (1) made an affirmative misrepresentation of material fact, failed to disclose
material information, or submitted false material information, and (2) intended to deceive the
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the current Rule 56, information is material to patentability if it establishes, by
itself or in combination, a prima facie case of unpatentability, or is inconsistent
with an applicant’s assertion to the Office.118
Prior to Therasense, these two elements were weighed on a “sliding scale,”
where a patent could be held unenforceable by a strong showing of materiality
and a minimal showing of intent, and vice versa. 119 The Therasense court
narrowed this definition by requiring both elements and setting higher thresholds
for each.
B. Federal Circuit Ruling in Therasense
1. Background
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., involves disposable blood
glucose strips used to help diabetics measure the glucose levels in their blood.120
An electrochemical reaction on the strip generates an electrical current
corresponding to the glucose concentration. 121 Therasense (now Abbott
Laboratories (Abbott)), owns U.S. Patents 5,820,551 (‘551) and 4,545,382
(‘382).122 The alleged novelty of the ’551 patent was that the reaction occurred
without an intervening membrane, whereas the ’382 patent required a
membrane.123
As pointed out by the examiner, the ’382 patent specification disclosed that a
protective membrane was optional, yet not required: “Optionally, but preferably
when being used on live blood, a protective membrane surrounds both the enzyme
and the mediator layers, permeable to water and glucose molecules.”124
In order to overcome this reference, the examiner required a qualified
scientist’s declaration swearing that one skilled in the art would read this
description as requiring a membrane.125 Abbott did exactly this, asserting that the
[PTO].’” (alteration in original) (quoting Cargill, Inc v. Canbra Foods, Ltd., 476 F.3d 1359, 1363
(Fed. Cir. 2007))).
118
37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b) (2010).
119
Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(“Thus, for example, where an objective “but-for” inquiry is satisfied . . . a lesser showing of facts
from which intent can be inferred may be sufficient to justify holding the patent invalid or
unenforceable, in whole or in part.”).
120
649 F.3d 1276, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
121
Id.
122
Id. at 1283.
123
Id.
124
Id. (citing U.S. Patent No. 4,545,382 (col. 4 at ll. 63–66) (filed Oct. 22, 1982)) (emphasis
added).
125
Id.
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“optionally, but preferably” language was mere “patent phraseology.” 126 The
examiner allowed the patent and on the day of issuance Abbott asserted it against
a competitor in an infringement action.127 Unfortunately for Abbott, this language
was inconsistent with a prior assertion in a sibling case prosecuted at the
European Patent Office (EPO).
2. EPO Prosecution
The ’382 patent application’s European counterpart issued as European Patent
0,078,636 (’636). During prosecution, Abbott made assertions that were exactly
opposite to the assertions made at the USPTO. For example, with respect to the
same “optionally, but preferably” language: “It is submitted that this disclosure is
unequivocally clear. The protective membrane is optional, however, it is
preferred when used on live blood in order to prevent the larger constituents of
the blood, in particular erythrocytes from interfering with the electrode sensor.”128
The Applicant never submitted the EPO assertion to the USPTO. The USPTO
examiner only allowed the contested patent after an affidavit was filed in which
an expert asserted a specific interpretation of the prior art. Becton pled inequitable
conduct on the grounds that this interpretation was inconsistent with
representations in the application prosecuted before the EPO.
3. Narrower Inequitable Conduct Standard in Therasense
In one fell swoop, the Therasense court shifted inequitable conduct
jurisprudence towards a stricter standard. The decision pivoted on how much
weight to give the assertions made to the EPO, which were withheld from the
USPTO and inconsistent with an affidavit filed with the USPTO just prior to
issuance.
The en banc panel affirmed that inequitable conduct requires intent to deceive
and materiality of the reference, but went further, holding that omitted
information is only material if “but-for” its exclusion the claim or patent would
not have issued.129 Similarly, the court affirmed that the standard for intent to

126

Id.
Abbott Labs. v. Lifescan, Inc., 37 F.Supp.2d 70 (D. Mass. Oct 1999).
128
See Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1284 (referring to J.A. 6585) (emphasis added).
129
Id. at 1291 (“When an applicant fails to disclose prior art to the PTO, that prior art is butfor material if the PTO would not have allowed a claim had it been aware of the undisclosed prior
art.”). But see id. at 1292 (“This court recognizes an exception in cases of affirmative egregious
misconduct. . . . [For example,] ‘deliberately planned and carefully executed scheme[s]’ to defraud
the PTO and the courts.” (quoting Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238,
245 (1944))).
127
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deceive also requires a threshold level of “clear and convincing” evidence.130 The
court went even further, holding that both elements must exceed the clear and
convincing evidence standard, as compared to the previously applied lower
standard of a preponderance of the evidence, and that they should not be weighed
on a sliding scale.131 A claim rejection is a USPTO judgment subject to review by
the courts. “But-for” materiality means that the omitted information renders the
claim invalid because the USPTO would not have allowed the claim if it had been
aware of the reference. This case-within-a-case invalidity is indeed far more
difficult to prove.
The court vacated and remanded the Therasense case with respect to the
inequitable conduct claims.132 With respect to materiality, the district court was
charged with determining whether the USPTO “would not have granted the patent
but for Abbott’s failure to disclose the EPO briefs.”133 With respect to intent to
deceive, the district court was charged with determining whether the practitioners
knew of the briefs and their materiality and “made the conscious decision not to
disclose them in order to deceive the PTO.”134
4. District Court Findings upon Remand
In March 2012, the district court applied this new stricter standard and
nonetheless found Abbott’s ’551 patent unenforceable due to inequitable
conduct.135 Citing the same evidence as above, the court found that the USPTO
would not have allowed the patent if it had been made aware of the EPO brief.136
The court also found that Abbott knew that the withheld assertion was
material and that the attorneys in question intentionally withheld this assertion
because it would seriously undermine the patentability of the invention.137 The
court found that the intent to deceive was especially strong in light of the
infringement suit filed the same day as issuance.138

130

Id. at 1290 (stating that the accused infringer must prove that the patent owner acted with
the specific intent to deceive the PTO (citing Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
537 F.3d 1357, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
131
Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290 (“A district court should not use a ‘sliding scale,’ where a
weak showing of intent may be found sufficient based on a strong showing of materiality, and vice
versa.”).
132
Id. at 1296.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 864 F. Supp. 2d 856, 869 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
136
See id. at 868.
137
Id. at 865.
138
Id. at 868.
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Today, the disputed patent is unenforceable,139 as the appeal was dismissed
and attorney fees awarded. 140 This provides an important example of what
constitutes inequitable conduct under the Federal Circuit’s stricter standard, since
it was applied to the very facts upon which the new standard was based.
Nonetheless, it is not entirely clear how an examiner would apply the Federal
Circuit’s Therasense inequitable conduct standard to material fraud during
supplemental examination.
C. Interplay Between Supplemental Examination and Therasense
Dictum in the Federal Circuit’s opinion in Therasense appears to predict a
reduction in inequitable conduct pleadings following the implementation of a
stricter standard.141 Although it may be too soon to assess the accuracy of this
prediction, supplemental examination provides an additional route for patent
owners to bypass these claims. Since the Therasense standard is the minimum
threshold for material fraud in supplemental examination, the holding has
additional impact beyond the courts. Supplemental examination should allow
patent owners to cleanse a patent from innocent oversights while still detecting
fraud. Yet given the statutory protection granted to the supplemental examination
request, the applicant’s control over the scope of examination, the Therasense
standard, and the exclusion of third parties, the Office will rarely uncover material
fraud. If material fraud is suspected, errors of commission will likely be treated
harsher than errors of omission.
1. The USPTO Could Uncover Material Fraud During Ex Parte
Reexamination
During supplemental examination, a patent owner is limited to submitting a
request, which “shall not be relevant to enforceability of the patent.”142 During the
actual examination, statements, interviews, and amendments are not allowed.143
Thus, a patent owner’s actions are limited to the submission request which “shall

139

Id. at 869.
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., No. C 04–02123 WHA, 2012 WL 1877895,
at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 22, 2012).
141
See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(“To address these concerns [of over-pleading inequitable conduct and over-disclosure of
marginally relevant prior art], this court adjusts . . . the standard for materiality.”).
142
35 U.S.C.A. § 257(c)(1) (West 2012).
143
Changes to Implement Supplemental Examination Provisions of the Leahy-Smith America
Invents Act and to Revise Reexamination Fees—Rules and Regulations, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,828,
48,853 (Aug. 14, 2012) [hereinafter Supplemental Examination Provisions of the AIA], available
at http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/fr_supp_exam.pdf (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. §§
1.620(c), (e), (f)).
140
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not be relevant to enforceability,” essentially a form of statutory immunity.144
Nonetheless, the Office must contemplate some situation where the supplemental
examination itself would uncover material fraud because it provided the
Therasense standard. Since the supplemental examination request has statutory
immunity, an ex parte reexamination ordered after supplemental examination
could reveal evidence of material fraud, though this is unlikely.
The request itself contains only information selected by the patent owner,
giving the applicant complete control over what information is reviewed.145 If the
prosecuting attorney is filing the supplemental examination request, he or she is
unlikely to volunteer information that could be considered material fraud since
this would put both the patent and the attorney’s license at risk. But patent
practitioners might think twice about “airing their dirty laundry.”146
Furthermore, if the patent owner changes representation and the new attorney
suspects material fraud during the prosecution, the attorney will likely advise
against supplemental examination since the patent could be declared invalid
during the ex parte reexamination.147 This disincentive to submit particularly
harmful information is aided by the exclusion of third parties148 whom may have
the most to gain from invalidating the patent. Thus, if the Office uncovers
material fraud, it will most likely be from a small subset of unsuspecting
practitioners or those with a high-risk tolerance. If this does happen, Therasense
provides a concrete example of the minimum level of conduct that could lead to
material fraud in practice.
2. Potential Examples of Material Fraud
a. Errors of Commission

144

35 U.S.C.A. § 257(c)(1) (West 2012).
See id. § 257(a) (West 2012).
146
Courtenay Brinckerhoff, Supplemental Examination: Airing Your Dirty Laundry?,
PHARMAPATENTS (Feb. 1, 2012), http://www.pharmapatentsblog.com/2012/02/01/supplementalexamination-airing-your-dirty-laundry/#page=1 (“The new Supplemental Examination provisions
have been described as a mechanism by which patent holders can ‘launder’ information that might
otherwise render their patents unenforceable. Perhaps the price of being able to launder
information to avoid inequitable conduct charges is having to air your dirty laundry in public.”).
147
See Roger Shang & Yar Chaikovsky, Inter Partes Reexamination of Patents: An Empirical
Evaluation, 15 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 11 (2006) (stating that, while lower than inter partes
reexamination, there is still a 10% invalidly rate for ex parte reexamination).
148
Supplemental Examination Provisions of the AIA, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,845 (to be codified at
37 C.F.R. § 1.601(b)).
145
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An error of commission is a mistake where an actor does something wrong, as
opposed to an error of omission where inaction is the mistake. 149 Errors of
commission can arise during patent prosecution when an applicant asserts
knowingly false or inconsistent statements or arguments, for example, when an
applicant refutes an examiner’s argument or makes an argument of
patentability.150 Failing to disclose the relevant information can breach the Rule
56 duty of disclosure.151 For example, the losing party in Therasense breached
this duty because the EPO brief was inconsistent with the USPTO affidavit.152
Although this withholding could be viewed as an error of omission because the
brief was not disclosed to the USPTO, it is more likely to be considered a false
statement or an error of commission because the affidavit directly contradicted the
EPO brief.
The USPTO and the courts treat errors of commission harsher than errors of
omission because the applicant had to take affirmative steps to make the error.153
Furthermore, it is easier to prove that an applicant had intent to deceive if there
are affirmative actions or statements, as opposed to inaction or silence. With
respect to supplemental examination and any subsequent reexamination, the

149

Error
of
commission,
CAMBRIDGE
DICTIONARIES
ONLINE,
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/business-english/error-of-commission (last visited May
23, 2013) (“[A] mistake that consists of doing something wrong . . .”); Error of omission,
CAMBRIDGE
DICTIONARIES
ONLINE,
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/businessenglish/error-of-omission?q=error+of+omission (last visited May 23, 2013) (“[A] mistake that
consists of not doing something you should have done . . .”).
150
37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b)(2)(i)–(ii) (2010) (“[I]nformation is material to patentability when it . . .
is inconsistent with, a position the applicant takes in: (i) Opposing an argument of unpatentability
relied on by the Office, or (ii) Asserting an argument of patentability.”).
151
Id. § 1.56(a) (“The duty to disclose all information known to be material to patentability is
deemed to be satisfied if all information known to be material to patentability of any claim issued
in a patent was cited by the Office or submitted to the Office . . . .”).
152
Id. § 1.56(b)(2)(i).
153
Larson Mfg. Co. of S.D., Inc. v. AluminArt Prods. Ltd., 559 F.3d 1317, 1343 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (Linn, J., concurring) (“The Supreme Court's three inequitable conduct cases involved overt
fraud, not equivocal acts of omission.” (citing Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto Maint.
Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 809, 819 (1945))); see also Erstling, supra note 30, at 337–38 (“The
seminal 1945 [Supreme Court] case of Precision Instrument Manufacturing Co. . . . involved
perjury and fraud in an interference proceeding. During the proceeding’s discovery phase, the
patentee learned that the opponent had lied by submitting false affidavits about the dates of
conception and disclosure of the invention as well as about inventorship. Rather than reporting the
fraud, the patentee settled the interference and received rights to both the patents in question.
When the patentee attempted to enforce the patents in a subsequent infringement action, the
district court refused to do so, and the Supreme Court ultimately agreed, arguing that not only the
doctrine of unclean hands, but also the public interest, precluded the enforcement of ‘perjurytainted patents.’” (footnotes omitted) (citing Precision Instrument Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. at 816)).
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USPTO is more likely to find material fraud if it uncovers an error of
commission.
b. Errors of Omission
During international patent prosecution, foreign offices often cite references
not cited by the USPTO. Practitioners will typically file an information disclosure
statement (IDS) with the Office to provide this reference to the examiner for
consideration in the prosecution of the U.S. patent.154 This can create a complex
web of references, especially when prosecuting multiple patents in multiple
jurisdictions and different languages. Supplemental examination can likely
remedy an inadvertent omission, especially if the reference is similar to references
previously raised by the USPTO.155
If the Therasense court instead considered a common error of omission, it is
difficult to see how the court would have found intent to deceive. For example, if
a reference was cited during the EPO prosecution and that reference was never
submitted to the USPTO, it would be difficult to prove that Abbott had specific
intent to deceive, especially under the clear and convincing evidence standard.
Thus, this error of omission would most likely be viewed in a more favorable
light.
Nonetheless, problems may arise, particularly if the reference was used to bar
patent rights in a foreign jurisdiction or significantly narrow the claims compared
to the U.S. counterpart. A savvy litigator could plant seeds of doubt that the patent
practitioner intentionally withheld the reference.
Based on the strict standard in Therasense, the Office is unlikely to uncover
material fraud during supplemental examination. This is because the request has
statutory immunity, the patent owner selects what information is considered, third
parties are excluded, and the standard requires particularly egregious conduct.
This is illustrated by the historical preference to find inequitable conduct in acts
of commission compared with acts of omission. Since filing a supplemental
examination request is by definition an act (as opposed to an omission), questions
invariably arise regarding whether supplemental examination could create new
grounds for inequitable conduct. The answer is an uncomfortable maybe.

154

37 C.F.R. § 1.98 (2010) (“Any information disclosure statement . . . shall include . . . (1) A
list of all patents, publications, applications, or other information submitted for consideration by
the Office.”).
155
See 35 U.S.C.A. § 257(c)(1) (West 2012) (stating that if the information raises no SNQP,
the patent cannot be held unenforceable).
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V. SCOPE OF SUPPLEMENTAL EXAMINATION VS. SCOPE OF IMMUNITY: COULD A
PATENTEE REMAIN VULNERABLE TO INEQUITABLE CONDUCT CLAIMS AFTER
SUPPLEMENTAL EXAMINATION?
Academic and public commentary illuminated potential mismatches between
the scope of immunity and the scope of the supplemental examination.156 This
may manifest in at least three fact patterns. First, assuming blanket immunity, a
disreputable patent owner may try to mislead the examiner by limiting the scope
of the identified issues, steering the examination away from sensitive subject
matter.157 Second, if a court limits immunity to the scope of examination, a patent
owner that does not fully recognize all possibilities may present a limited case,
opening the door to, albeit narrower, inequitable conduct claims. 158 Third, a
position taken during supplemental examination, if contrary to prior assertions,
may create fodder for future inequitable conduct claims.159
A. Immunity Awarded to Undeserving Patent due to Mischaracterization by a
Mistaken or Disreputable Applicant
Many comments, and at least two law review articles, 160 pointed out a
potential loophole in the law where, whether by mistake or unethical behavior, an
undeserving patent may obtain “amnesty” from inequitable conduct claims. This
possibility is rooted in the potential disconnect between the scope of the
examination and the scope of rights awarded by supplemental examination.
1. Scope of Supplemental Examination
At first glance, the scope of the supplemental examination is identical to the
scope of rights awarded because the examination explores all information

156

See generally White, supra note 39.
See infra Part V.A.1–2.
158
See infra Part V.A.4.
159
See infra Part V.B.
160
Jason Rantanen & Lee Petherbridge, Toward a System of Invention Registration: The
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 110 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 24, 25 (2011)
(describing supplemental examination as a patent amnesty program, “encourag[ing] patent
applicants to use any number of strategies that would never have been countenanced under preAIA law to obtain patents, and it offers to cure all but the most extreme through filing a
supplemental examination request.”); see also Jason Rantanen et al., America Invents, More or
Less?, 160 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 229, 231 (2012) (“Another change that carries the
potential to reduce patent-encouraged innovation is the AIA's supplemental examination
provision, which immunizes patents from charges that applicants deceived the Patent Office into
allowing patents that do not satisfy the requirements for patentability.” (citing 35 U.S.C.A. § 257
(West 2012)).
157
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presented, and the immunity applies to the entire patent with respect to that
information.161
The statute compels the Director to indicate whether the “information
presented in the request raises a substantial new question of patentability.”162
There is no reason to believe that “information” should be interpreted differently
from the Rule 56 duty of disclosure in patent cases, which requires that patent
owners disclose information material to any claim.163 Material information is
somewhat circularly defined as anything “material to patentability.” 164 This
includes patents and printed publications but also prior public uses, sales, offers to
sell, and prior invention by another. Thus, in theory, all “information” is
considered when determining if a SNQP exists. In practice though, the rules allow
a patent owner to mislead the examiner, whether intentionally or accidentally. The
rules require that the supplemental examination request contain “[a] separate,
detailed explanation of the relevance and manner of applying each item of
information to each claim of the patent for which supplemental examination is
requested.”165
Thus, supplemental examination may not examine all claims in a patent. The
option to limit which claims are examined is reiterated: “The determination will
generally be limited to a review of the item(s) of information identified in the
request as applied to the identified claim(s) of the patent.”166
Optionally, a patent owner may attempt to frame the issues by including “an
explanation of how the claims patentably distinguish over the items of
information”167 or an “explanation of why each item of information submitted
with the request does or does not raise a substantial new question of
patentability.”168 The Office most likely implemented these mechanisms in order
to reduce the burden on the examiners by forcing the patent owner to focus on the
relevant issues and pertinent claims. Yet this can introduce significant bias.
161

35 U.S.C.A. § 257(a), (c) (West 2012) (stating that “information” is examined with respect
to a “patent” and the “patent” cannot be held unenforceable based on that “information”).
162
Id. § 257(a) (West 2012) (emphasis added).
163
37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2010).
164
MPEP, supra note 65, § 2001.04.
165
Changes to Implement Supplemental Examination Provisions of the Leahy-Smith America
Invents Act and to Revise Reexamination Fees—Rules and Regulations, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,828,
48,852 (Aug. 14, 2012) [hereinafter Supplemental Examination Provisions of the AIA] (emphasis
added), available at http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/fr_supp_exam.pdf (to be codified
at 37 C.F.R. pt. § 1.620(b)(5)).
166
Id. (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.620(a)) (emphasis added).
167
Id. at 48,852 (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.610(c)(3)).
168
Id. at 48,852 (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.610(c)(4)).
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Within these optional explanations, any relevant issues will most likely be
framed in the light most favorable to the patent owner. Furthermore, by limiting
the scope of the supplemental examination to the “claim[s] . . . requested,”169 the
patent owner may sidestep the very questions of patentability that the information
raises. This could create a brand new allegation of inequitable conduct. For
example, the intentional misdirection of the examiner to avoid a valid SNQP
could lay the grounds for future inequitable conduct claims even though the initial
failure to submit the reference may not be inequitable.
Assuming not every conceivable issue is presented and examined,
supplemental examination is unlikely to explore every aspect of the presented
information in view of all allowed claims. The mismatch in scope of examination
is paired with a mismatch in the scope of immunity.
2. Scope of Immunity
The statute compels the courts to provide full immunity to inequitable conduct
claims stemming from references submitted for supplemental examination: “A
patent shall not be held unenforceable on the basis of conduct relating to
information” if that information is considered during supplemental
examination. 170 A plain reading of the statute implies that if an item of
information is presented during supplemental examination a court has no choice
but to dismiss all inequitable conduct claims “relating” to that information.171 This
protection extends to the “patent” rather than just the patent claims scrutinized
during supplemental examination. The clear statutory language provides minimal
room to maneuver.
This presents an opportunity for a disreputable practitioner to obtain
“amnesty” from actual inequitable behavior.172 As outlined in one comment, the
patent owner could limit the examination to patent owner-identified issues of
patentability yet claim the full statutory protection.173 Thus, a patent owner could

169

Id. (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.610(b)(5)).
35 U.S.C.A. § 257(c) (West 2012) (emphasis added).
171
Id. § 257(c) (West 2012) (“shall” indicates that the court must dismiss claims “relating to
information . . . considered . . . during a supplemental examination”).
172
Rantanen & Petherbridge, supra note 160, at 25.
173
Letter from William P. Berridge, Oliff & Berridge, PLC, to Cynthia L. Nessler, U.S. Patent
& Trademark Office, Office of Patent Legal Admin., at 7 (Mar. 20, 2012) (on file with USPTO),
available at http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/comments/sup_exam/xs_d-oliff_20120320.pdf
(“[T]he USPTO proposes to allow patent owners to determine the contours of supplemental
information and limit the USPTO’s consideration of information to only patent owner-identified
issues of patentability and claims, while providing those same patent owners with the full statutory
exemption from inequitable conduct claims.”).
170
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use supplemental examination as a shield such that the Office never addresses the
actual issues of patentability.174
3. USPTO Response
The USPTO briefly addressed suggestions that supplemental examination
should “entail a general reassessment of all issues of patentability” as opposed to
only applicant-identified issues. 175 The Office asserted that supplemental
examination will be “generally limited to a review of the item(s) of information
identified in the request with respect to the identified claim(s) of the patent.”176
By using the words “generally limited,” the Office reserves the right to broaden
the scope of supplemental examination beyond the identified claims. Yet later in
the response, the Office “put[s] the patent owner on notice that unless the patent
owner identifies the particular claim(s) which the patent owner requests the Office
to consider with respect to each item of information, the record may not reflect
that these claim(s) were explicitly considered by the examiner.”177
This appears to conflict with the broad statutory language that “information”
considered during supplemental examination cannot be raised in an inequitable
conduct claim. Nonetheless, citing the burden of completing an “accurate and
comprehensive determination” within the three-month statutory window, the
Office resolutely places the onus on the patent owner to call out all the claims
related to any SNQP.178 The Office ends by noting that, contrary to the statutory
language, the scope of immunity could be a judicial question “within the purview
of the courts.”179
4. An Incomplete Supplemental Examination May Leave Patentees
Vulnerable to Limited Inequitable Conduct Claims
A court could limit the scope of inequitable conduct immunity to be
commensurate with the scope of examination. This means that an item of
information presented during supplemental examination could potentially be
asserted in an inequitable conduct claim if it was not fully considered, for
174

Id. at 8 (“[T]he patent owner would have effectively used supplemental examination to
protect itself against an allegation of inequitable conduct without the USPTO or the court actually
analyzing relevant issues of patentability and relevant claims.”).
175
Supplemental Examination Provisions of the AIA, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,843 (characterizing
comment 25).
176
Id. (referring to proposed 37 C.F.R. § 1.620(a)) (emphasis added).
177
Id.
178
Id.
179
Id. (“As to the level of unenforceability protection, the issue of whether a court would be
statutorily required to dismiss all allegations of inequitable conduct involving a particular item of
information is within the purview of the courts.”).
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example, if some claims are not examined or are incompletely examined. This
runs contrary to the statutory language barring inequitable conduct claims
“bas[ed] on conduct relating to information” considered during supplemental
examination.180 Furthermore, this undoing of statutory immunity would likely
complicate the litigation, raising costs and the burden on courts.
A judicial interpretation to allow inequitable conduct claims relating to
information considered during supplemental examination would appear to
undermine the statutory language. As noted above, a court “shall not” hold a
patent unenforceable on grounds relating to information considered during
supplemental examination.181 Thus, it is unlikely, but not inconceivable, that a
court would limit the scope of immunity to anything less than the entire patent. If
a court did indeed limit the immunity, it would most likely be commensurate with
the scope of examination. Since the Office would have only examined the
selected claims in view of the new information, it makes sense to extend statutory
protection to the examined claims.
Thus, a safe route for both patent owners and practitioners is to request
examination of all claims. Additionally, keeping the characterization of the
invention and prior art to a minimum should reduce any practitioner-introduced
bias. By keeping the scope of supplemental examination as broad as possible, the
patent owner should, in theory, be awarded with broad immunity.
B. Supplemental Examination Could Create New Grounds for Inequitable
Conduct Not Protected by Limited Immunity
Though unlikely, a patent could receive only limited protection after
supplemental examination. If so, one question is whether conduct relating to the
supplemental examination could create new grounds for inequitable conduct. For
example, the written explanation of the “relevance and manner” 182 in which the
information relates to the claims could run contrary to a stance taken during
prosecution.183 Furthermore, an unethical practitioner could avoid addressing the
very SNQP that the information raises by limiting the scope to a less significant
issue. Regardless of the nature, the statute appears to shield supplemental
180

35 U.S.C.A. § 257(c)(1) (West 2012).
Id.
182
Supplemental Examination Provisions of the AIA, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,852 (to be codified at
37 C.F.R. § 1.610(b)(5)).
183
Letter from Donika P. Pentcheva & Theodore M. Magee, Minn. Intellectual Prop. Law
Ass’n, to Cynthia L. Nessler, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Office of Patent Legal Admin., at 3
(Mar.
26,
2012)
(on
file
with
USPTO),
available
at
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/comments/sup_exam/xs_a-mipla_20120326.pdf (the optional
detailed explanation for each identified issue (and other explanations) are “unnecessary and places
the Owner(s) in jeopardy of raising new inequitable conduct issues.”).
181
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examinees from inequitable conduct claims relating to the supplemental
examination request,184 though issues may arise during an ensuing reexamination.
After submitting a supplemental examination request, the patent owner is
effectively barred from communicating with the Office regarding substantive
matters in the supplemental examination. Prohibited actions include conducting
interviews 185 as well as submitting alternative claim language or proposed
amendments.186 Even if ex parte reexamination is ordered after supplemental
examination, the patent owner does not have the right to file a statement or
proposed amendment.187
Thus, outside of the initial supplemental examination request, there is little
opportunity during supplemental examination for a patent owner to act
inequitably. Yet, any number of issues could arise during the subsequent ex parte
reexamination. “The Federal Circuit has held that the submission of information
during reexamination . . . does not bar a subsequent inequitable conduct defense
based on that information.”188
Although the supplemental examination request is entitled to statutory
immunity, § 257 grants no protection to the subsequent reexamination. 189
Furthermore, any protection granted to the request is limited to inequitable
conduct defenses under § 282.190 Thus, some conduct surrounding the request and
any ex parte reexamination is still subject to Rule 56 sanctions. For example, if a
practitioner attempts to avoid addressing a SNQP in a request by
mischaracterizing a reference, the practitioner could be subject to Office
disciplinary proceedings.
Supplemental examination provides a shield that only deflects inequitable
conduct attacks in a courtroom. As such, patent owners should be on guard when
184

35 U.S.C.A. § 257(c)(1) (West 2012) (“The making of a [supplemental examination]
request . . . shall not be relevant to enforceability of the patent under section 282.”).
185
Supplemental Examination Provisions of the AIA, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,853 (to be codified at
37 C.F.R. § 1.620(e)).
186
Id. (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.620(f)); see also id. at 48,844 (stating in response to
comment 30 that amendments could “create a cloud on the patent” if the Office determines that no
SNQP exists).
187
35 U.S.C.A. § 257(b) (West 2012).
188
Robert Greene Sterne et al., America Invents Act: The 5 New Post-Issuance Procedures, 13
SEDONA CONF. J. 27, 58 (2012) (citing Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc.,
326 F.3d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
189
35 U.S.C.A. § 257(b) (West 2012) (stating that if ex parte reexamination is ordered, the
statute makes no mention of enforceability or lack thereof).
190
Id. § 257(c)(1) (West 2012) (“The making of a request . . . shall not be relevant to
enforceability of the patent under section 282.”).
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submitting a supplemental examination request. The statutory immunity during
litigation is unlikely to apply to other proceedings in the Office. Although a
supplemental examination request is unlikely to generate fodder for future
inequitable conduct claims, a patent practitioner may still become ensnared in
other Office matters if not careful.
VI. PROPOSED STATUTORY AND & REGULATORY CHANGES
As presently enacted, supplemental examination is unlikely to significantly
reduce the number of inequitable conduct claims pled during patent infringement
suits. This is because the cost is high, the scope of examination and immunity are
uncertain, and patent attorneys will be hesitant to inadvertently create fodder for
future inequitable conduct claims. Congress should amend § 257 to improve
access to supplemental examination and reduce these uncertainties, aligning the
proceedings with the congressional intent. Revised statutory language is
proposed191 and discussed192 below.
A. Proposed Statutory Language
Congress should append the italicized language after the last sentence of 35
U.S.C. § 257(a):
A patent owner may request supplemental examination of a patent in the
Office to consider, reconsider, or correct information believed to be
relevant to the patent, in accordance with such requirements as the
Director may establish. Within 3 months after the date a request for
supplemental examination meeting the requirements of this section is
received, the Director shall conduct the supplemental examination and
shall conclude such examination by issuing a certificate indicating
whether the information presented in the request raises a substantial new
question of patentability. The Director may extend the three-month
deadline at the request of the Applicant.
Congress should amend 35 U.S.C. § 257(c)(1) to incorporate the following
italicized language:
A patent shall not be held unenforceable, with respect to a claim in
the patent, on the basis of conduct relating to information that had
not been considered, was inadequately considered, or was incorrect
in a prior examination of the patent claim if the information was
considered, reconsidered, or corrected during a supplemental
examination of the patent claim. The making of a request under
191
192

See infra Part VI.A.
See infra Part VI.B–D.
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subsection (a), or the absence thereof, shall not be relevant to
enforceability of the patent under section 282 or 37 C.F.R. § 1.56.
B. Applicant-Initiated Exception to the Three-Month Limit Allows a Simpler Fee
Structure.
The proposed amendment to § 257(a) enables an applicant to extend the threemonth statutory limit, providing the USPTO with an avenue to create a simpler
fee structure. This would enable a sliding scale fee approach because the Office
would not be under the time pressure when considering thirteen items or more.
Additionally, the sliding scale could have a lower limit of one item, so that the
remedial cost for a single flaw in prosecution is less than twelve flaws. Overall,
this is a step towards making the fees commensurate with the burden on the
Office. Importantly, the USPTO would have to amend 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.605193 and
1.620194 accordingly for the statutory amendment to have an effect.
C. Limit the Scope of Immunity to the Claims Examined
The proposed amendments to § 257(c) regarding patent claims should clarify
the scope of examination and immunity. The proposed amendment requires a
claim to be considered during supplemental examination in order to qualify for
statutory protection from inequitable conduct. This eliminates the loophole where
a practitioner could direct the examiner to only one claim yet receive full statutory
protection for the entire patent.
Unfortunately, this still leaves open the possibility that a disreputable
practitioner may try to steer the examiner away from a sensitive issue. This is an
acceptable compromise because it is unreasonable to expect the examiner to
consider every conceivable way that an item of information could apply to a given
claim. If the examiner is directed to both the claim and item of information, the
examiner will likely scrutinize the reference at least as closely, if not closer, as
during an initial patent prosecution. This should greatly reduce the likelihood that
a significant issue slips past the examiner.
193

37 C.F.R. § 1.605(a) (2010) (proposed italicized language to be added after the first
sentence: “Each request for supplemental examination may include no more than twelve items of
information believed to be relevant to the patent. The Director may allow a supplemental
examination request to include more than twelve items if the Applicant waives the three-month
deadline for the Office to respond. More than one request for supplemental examination of the
same patent may be filed at any time during the period of enforceability of the patent.”).
194
Id. § 1.620(a) (proposed italicized language to be added after the first sentence: “Within
three months after the filing date of a request for supplemental examination, the Office will
determine whether a substantial new question of patentability affecting any claim of the patent is
raised by any of the items of information presented in the request. The Director may extend the
three-month deadline at the request of the Applicant. The determination . . . .”).
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D. Extend the Protection Given to the Request to Rule 56
The proposed amendment to § 257(c) extends the protection given to the
supplemental examination request beyond inequitable conduct in court and to
Rule 56 at the USPTO. Including Rule 56 immunity will eliminate the possibility
that the request itself creates disciplinary grounds before the USPTO. If the Office
believes that content in the request could be considered inequitable,
reexamination can be ordered and any issues clarified. This is important because
it will increase access to supplemental examination by reducing uncertainty. A
patent practitioner will likely be hesitant to submit a supplemental examination
request if it could lead to Rule 56 disciplinary proceedings. The proposed
amendment aligns the interests of practitioners with the patent owner.
These proposed statutory amendments close loopholes in the supplemental
examination proceedings and increase access. As more patents undergo the
scrutiny of supplemental examination, fewer patents will be eligible for
inequitable conduct claims in lawsuits, furthering the intent of Congress.
VII. CONCLUSION
Supplemental examination is a good start in the effort to stem the “plague” of
inequitable conduct claims. As currently implemented, it is unlikely to be the
panacea that Congress envisioned while drafting the AIA. Future amendments
may increase access to the proceedings by making supplemental examination
cheaper and reducing the risk that an honest practitioner inadvertently create
evidence that could be used in future inequitable conduct claims.
Supplemental examination requires a patent owner to part with a large sum of
money to examine up to twelve items, though a large fraction may be refunded.
This fixed-fee structure unlinks the fee from the burden of examination. The
Office could implement a sliding scale if Congress allowed exceptions to the
three-month statutory turnaround time, lowering fees and simplifying examination
of large portfolios.
The Office predicts scenarios where it may uncover material fraud during
supplemental examination. To assist the examiners, the Office set the threshold
for material fraud to be narrower than inequitable conduct in Therasense.
Applicants’ actions will have to be especially egregious to exceed this strict
standard. Given the limited interaction with the Office during supplemental
examination, as well as statutory protection, the Office will rarely uncover
material fraud. This will be reinforced by practitioners’ hesitancy to submit
information that they know could be considered fraudulent.
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The statutory language, especially in view of the USPTO rules, leaves room
for judicial interpretation of whether the scope of supplemental examination
matches the scope of protection from inequitable conduct proceedings. Depending
on the statutory construction, at least three mechanisms exist where supplemental
examination could give rise to inequitable conduct. First, a disreputable patent
owner could mislead the examiner by steering the examination away from
sensitive subject matter. Second, a patent owner that does not fully recognize all
possibilities may present a limited case, opening the door to, albeit narrower,
inequitable conduct claims. Third, a position taken during supplemental
examination, if contrary to prior assertions, may create fodder for future
inequitable conduct claims or Rule 56 violations. Statutory amendments could
reduce the likelihood that these scenarios arise in practice.
Supplemental examination will likely become a niche arena like many of the
other post-issuance proceedings. In some cases, it is likely to reduce claims of
inequitable conduct, though many practitioners may hesitate to risk an issued
patent and their clean record by acknowledging supposed flaws in prosecution.
Supplemental examination will most likely be a precursor to most infringement
suits because of the lower cost compared to litigation discovery. Furthermore, it
will likely be used to expunge errors by less sophisticated counsel if technology
based on a patent is pending purchase or further investment.
Though the future of supplemental examination is uncertain, these questions
should resolve with time, and we will be able to better judge whether
supplemental examination helped to reduce the “plague” of inequitable conduct
pleadings.

